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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
of the then existing Civil Practice Act.16 , However, the Allen case is the first
in over fifty years where the Court of Appeals has been called upon. to
interpret Section 290-c of the New York Tax Law, which Tax Law has remained
virtually unchanged over this period. To read the Tax Law in a vacuum,
however, would be a considerable error, for as was said in the case of the
People v. Sexton,'7 it must be read in conjunction with the Civil Practice Act
where the Tax Law is silent. Section 290-c of the Tax Law says nothing of
misjoinder of parties. The Civil Practice Act is where the pressures for more
liberalized joinder procedures are reflected, not in the opinions of cases
decided fifty years ago. In particular, Section 290-c of the Tax Law must be
read in conjunction with Section 96 of the Civil Practice Act.' 8 The result is
that now a motion to have joined parties file separate claims can only be
granted, as Section 96 of the Civil Practice Act says, "Whenever it can be
done without prejudice to a substantial right.' 19
Six-YEAR STATUTE or LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO MuNiciPAL LAW SECTION
205-A ACTION
New York General Municipal Law, Section 205-a, grants to a fireman
injured on the job a right of action to recover a minimum of $1000 from the
violator of a government regulation if the violation was the cause of the injury.
Is such an action one for a penalty or one for compensation?
That question was decided by the Court of Appeals in Sicolo v. Prudential
Savings Bank of Brooklyn.20 In December 1951 the plaintiff fireman was
injured while fighting a fire in defendant's bank building. The original com-
plaint charging negligence was served in January'1954 and was dismissed for
insufficiency in March 1956.21 An amended complaint,22 setting forth a cause
of action under Section 205-a, was served in May 1956, more than four years
after the accident. Defendant contended that an action under Section 205-a
was one for a penalty and therefore within the three year limitation of Section
49 of the New York Civil Practice Act. Plaintiff maintained that the action was
merely one on a liability created by statute and so within the six year limitation
of Section 48.23 Special Term denied defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint.2 4 The Appellate Division reversed that ruling and granted defend-
ant's motion.25
16. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1920, ch. 925, 209. At that time this section of the Civ. PRAc.
Act stated that a motion to sever may be granted if joinder "may embarrass or delay the
trial of the action ....
17. 274 N.Y. 304, 8 N.E. 869 (1937).
18. Section 96 of the N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr states that a proceeding "may be
severed ... whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right."
19. Ibid.
20. 5 N.Y.2d 254, 184 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1959).
21. 2 Misc.2d 289, 151 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
22. The amended complaint charged that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the
defendant's violation of the New York City Administrative Code § C19-161.1 which
forbids the use of combustible draperies under certain conditions.
23. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 48.
24. Sicolo v. Prudential Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 155 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
25. Sicolo v. Prudential Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 4 A.D.2d 790, 165 N.Y.S.2d
222 (2d Dep't 1957).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals held that the action was one for compensation,
that the six year limitation was therefore applicable and that the decision of
the Appellate Division must be reversed and the matter remitted to Special
Term for further action. The unanimous court, speaking through Desmond, J.,
declared that the "true test" for distinguishing between a penalty and com-
pensation is whether the remedy "is impressed for punishment or for redress
of injury to an individual. '26 It pointed out that statutorily doubled damages
have been held not to be a penalty in workmen's compensation cases under both
federal and state laws.
Several of the cases cited by the court may be distinguished from the
instant case, however. In Bogartz v. Astor27 and Sackolwitz v. Charles Hamburg
Co.,2 8 the Court of Appeals held that Section 14-a of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law does not impose a penalty although it doubles the amount otherwise
payable, if the injured or deceased worker is an illegally employed minor.
The statute specifically refers to this as "double compensation." Moreover, as
noted by the court in Sackolwitz, the intent of the legislature in adding Section
14-a was to insure that a child would be awarded benefits comparable to
what he could have recovered under the common law rather than the relatively
meagre percentage of his wages under the statute.29 Similarly, the doubled
damages provided for in suits for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 193830 was held not to be a penalty in Walsh v. 515
Madison Ave. Corp.31 and in Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave. Corp.32 Here again
the conclusion was supported directly by the language of the statute. The
act specifies that an employee may recover an amount equal to the unpaid
wages as "liquidated damages." There, too, the court observed that the amount
of recovery was not "so plainly disproportionate to the loss to be treated as a
penalty." 33 In each of these cases, the conclusion that a penalty was not in-
tended to be imposed was supported by the presence of specific statutory
language. Similar language cannot be found in Section 205-a. Moreover, in
each of these cases, the court found that there was a reasonable relation between
the loss suffered and the recovery permitted.
In the Sicolo case,34 however, the defendant urged that since Section 205-a
provides for a minimum recovery of $1000, recovery in some cases would
actually exceed proven damages. The court rejected defendant's conclusion
that such a recovery would be a penalty on the basis of the holding in Cox v.
26. Supra note 20 at 258, 103.
27. 293 N.Y. 563, 59 N.E.2d 246 (1944).
28. 295 N.Y. 264, 67 N.E.2d 152 (1946).
29. Id. at 269, 155.
30. 52 STAT. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 216b as amended 63 STAT. 910 (1949).
31. 293 N.Y. 826, 50 N.E.2d 183 (1944).
32. 65 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd 156 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd 331
U.S. 199 (1947).
33. Walsh v. 515 Madison Ave. Corp., 181 Misc. 219,42 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
34. Supra note 20.
